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Both in the US and in Europe anti money laundering policy switched from a rule- 
to a risk-based reporting system in order to avoid over-reporting by the private 
sector. However, reporting increased in most countries, while the quality of 
information decreased. Governments drowned in data because private agents feared 
sanctions for not reporting. This ‘‘crying wolf’ problem’ (Takats 2007) did not happen 
in the Netherlands, where the number of reports diminished but information quality 
improved. Reasons for this can be found in differences in legal institutions and legal 
culture, notably the contrast between US adversarial legalism and Dutch cooperative 
informalism. The established legal systems also provide for resistance to change. 
Thus lowering sanctions in order to reduce over-reporting may not be a realistic 
option in a legal system which traditionally uses deterrence by fierce criminal and 
private legal sanctions. Furthermore, a risk-based approach may not be sustainable 
in the long run, as litigation may eventually replace a risk-based approach again by 
a rule-based one, now with precise rules set by the courts. 
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1. Introduction  
 
  Awareness has grown that money laundering is harmful. It makes crime pay, changes the 
cost-benefit calculation of criminals (Becker 1968) and enhances their incentives to engage in 
criminal activities. Also in other respects can money laundering have negative effects on society, 
economy and politics. Honest business may get crowded out. Financial markets may loose in 
integrity  and  that  could  have  serious  impact  on  large  financial  centers  and  their  reputation. 
Corruption may increase in some sectors and eventually in the whole economy. The underworld 
could  get  intertwined  with  the  upperworld.  Launderers  and  other  criminals  could  undermine 
politics which poses a threat to democracy. Terrorist financing is nowadays also considered part 
of money laundering and poses additional threats to society.  
  Governments have, therefore, found it necessary to combat money laundering. In order to 
do so, money laundering risks, potential money launderers and laundering transactions have to be 
identified. For this, governments are dependent on information of the private sector. Financial 
institutions and transaction partners or intermediaries involved in businesses prone to  money 
laundering,  like  second  hand  car  dealers,  real  estate  agents,  casinos  or  lawyers,  encounter 
(potential) money laundering transactions in their daily business. They may or could see dubious 
transactions which they may suspect of money laundering. Governments need hints as to which 
transactions from which persons or companies seem dubious. Private businesses must be willing 
to give such information and if necessary actively search for it. They must filter their transactions 
for  possible  cases  of  money  laundering.  Private  businesses  are  not  likely  to  submit  such 
information voluntarily, as it could threaten their reputation and relations with their clients. They 
would have to be forced to do so. The government has the authority to do so, but it has to follow 
the rule of law, that is, enact formal legislation. In the interest of legal security it has to make 
explicit what information the private sector has to provide, what negative or positive incentives 
back up this obligation, and under which conditions the sticks and/or carrots will be applied.   
  In the following several regulatory  approaches to money  laundering reporting will be 
discussed and evaluated, notably rule-based and risk-based regulation. The rule-based approach 
implied that governments enacted regulations imposing rather precise norms on private business 
to adhere to, in this case precise norms as to what transactions to report to public authorities. By 
contrast,  the  risk-based  approach  gave  private  actors  more  discretion  what  to  report.  The 
regulations instructed private business to report transactions that they considered suspicious of 
possible money laundering, i.e. it gave them vaguer criteria as to what transactions to report. The 
risk-based  approach  did  not  only  mean  that  private  actors  had  to  estimate  the  risks  of  a 
transaction being suspect of money laundering; it also meant that they themselves ran the risks of 
getting accused of false reporting or more in general of being held responsible for whether they 
did a good job or not. In section 2 we will elaborate the differences between rule- and risk-based 
regulation and discuss some of the advantages and disadvantages of them. A rule-based approach 
provides precise rules and hence legal certainty, but it also encourages formalistic over-reporting. 
This is why many countries switched to a risk-based approach, in the hope of reducing over-
reporting. Yet it often had the opposite effect, and encouraged even more relatively useless-over-
reporting, also called the ‘crying wolf problem’ (Takats 2007, Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro 
2009). In section 3 we will then compare the reporting systems of two countries, the United 
States and the Netherlands. Both countries moved from rule- to risk-based regulation. Yet, the 
consequences were rather different, almost the opposite, as we will show in section 4. Under the 
new risk-based approach the amount of reporting in the US increased (and as Dalla Pellegrina 
and  Masciandaro  2009  show,  also  in  many  other  countries),  whereas  it  decreased  in  the   2 
Netherlands.  However,  the  quality  of  information  provided  by  the  private  sector  to  the 
government  in  the  US  declined,  whereas  there  is  no  indication  that  it  worsened  in  the 
Netherlands. On the contrary, it seemed to have improved, judging by the relative number of 
convictions for money laundering which were in recent years much higher in the Netherlands 
than in the US. In section 5 we try to find an explanation for this puzzle: More or less similar 
regulatory  measures  have  different  policy  outcomes  as  they  are  conditioned  by  intermediary 
variables, notably the differences in legal systems, that is, in legal institutions and legal cultures. 
Section 6 then draws conclusions and discusses some alternative regulatory measures and the 
future fate of risk-based regulation.  
 
 
2. On Rule- and Risk-Based Regulation 
 
2.1. The Long-Term Historical Trend: From Broad and Vague Standards to Detailed and 
Precise Rules 
 
Governments can be more or less precise in the legal obligations which they impose upon citizens 
and business. In the law and economics literature, it is customary to call precise norms rules and 
less precise ones standards (Ehrlich and Posner 1974, Diver 1983, Kaplow 1992, Schäfer 2002).
1 
Rules  are  clear  and  straightforward  and  draw  precise  boundaries  between  legal  and  illegal 
behavior. Standards, however, ‘are general legal criteria which are unclear and fuzzy and require 
complicated judiciary decision making’ (Schäfer 2002: 1) Typical standards are found in English 
common law, such as the standard of ‘due diligence’
2 or of ‘reasonable care’ in tort law, of ‘duty 
of care’ and of ‘fiduciary duty’ (Johnson et al 2000), or the prohibition of behavior such as 
negligence, invasion of privacy, nuisance, fraud, deception, murder, restraint of trade, etc. Such 
broad terms require specification and that is done when courts apply them (or not) in concrete 
cases. Over the course  of time such broad and vague standards have  acquired  rather precise 
meanings through judicial decisions. 
  The legislator can enact laws with either precise, detailed norms or with broader and 
vaguer standards. In the case of the latter, those implementing and enforcing the law, public 
administrators, inspectors, judges but also private actors, have a greater discretionary authority. 
That affects the costs involved. The formulation of a broad standard is easily done and hence 
cheap. It is usually also easier to get a parliamentary majority if not consensus over norms such 
as the right to freedom and privacy or a ban on discrimination and slander. Disagreement comes 
over the detail, over the operationalization, and over how to balance it against other standards, 
e.g.  slander  versus  free  speech.  Therefore,  broad  standards  entail  significant  costs  in 
implementation  and  enforcement.  Posner  (1998)  identified  the  following  costs:  of  the 
specification of the norm, of the process of adjudication, and of the legal uncertainty due to the 
large discretionary authority of the bureaucrats and judges, which could force subjects to take 
possibly unnecessary preventive measures. 
                                                 
1 It must be said that the term standards is also often used for the opposite, for detailed and precise norms, notably 
outside of the law and economics world, e.g. among socio-legal scholars and in general discourse on technical 
standards (a.o. Voelzkow 1996). Technical standards are highly specific norms that allow for ‘standardization’ . 
There, broad general norms are often referred to as ‘principles’ or ‘doctrines’. 
2 Made more concrete in the ‘customer due diligence’ standard in anti-money-laundering regulations.   3 
  Historically, there has been a trend to reduce the legal uncertainty stemming from the 
discretion of judges. In English common law this was based on the principle of the force of 
precedent of earlier judicial decisions. In order to inform judges about those earlier decisions  
treatises  containing  collections  of  common  law  decisions  were  compiled,  and  they  were 
somewhat  generalized  in  the  famous  ‘Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England’  by  William 
Blackstone in the later 18
th century, which was easier to carry around. In civil law countries the 
codification movement of the 18
th and 19
th centuries deduced more general but still concrete rules 
out of customary law in those countries, and using Roman law as a basis. These general rules 
were collected in codices such as the Code Napoleon or the Algemeines Landrecht of Prussia, 
both from around 1800 (Koselleck 1967), which were quite detailed. Schäfer (2002: 5) mentions 
that the Prussian code ‘had more than 19.000 articles, four times more than the modern civil code 
and the criminal code of Germany taken together’. These law books gave precise guidance to 
citizens, administrators, and judges, as they defined in detail what was lawful and what unlawful. 
Their  freedom  was  limited,  but  so  was  their  freedom  from  arbitrariness.  This  legality  and 
consistency increased certainty and predictability, thus also facilitating economic transactions by 
reducing  their  risks  and  uncertainties.  It  became  easier  to  conclude  economically  efficient 
contracts, as costs could be calculated easier ahead of time.  
  Given this tradition of increasing precision in regulation it was not surprising 
 that the first Anti-Money Laundering laws in most countries, including the Netherlands and the 
US,  were  so-called  rule-based.  They  contained  clear  formal  criteria  given  by  the  state  to 
business.  Whether  a  transaction  could  be  called  unusual  or  suspicious,  was  decided  by  the 
regulator. He set the criteria for identification of a potential money laundering case. For example 
every transaction above a certain threshold amount was considered suspect or unusual and had to 
be  reported.  Governments  wanted  to  minimize  the  discretion  of  the  private  actors  whose 
information it wanted. On the one hand to be sure that any possible money laundering transaction 
would be reported, on the other hand to keep the risk and uncertainty for business low.  
  The rules were clear and transparent, thus provided legal certainty and legal equality, as 
all subjects of the regulation were confronted with the same precise norms. But this approach had 
also  disadvantages.  Criminals  could  manipulate  their  transactions  so  that  they  would  be  just 
below the threshold. The formal rule could lead to over-reporting and high reporting costs for the 
private sector. It was rigid, formalistic, bureaucratic, and entailed high administrative burdens 
and hence was considered ineffective and inefficient.  
 
 
2.2. Now back again from Precise to Vaguer Norms with the Move from Rule- to  Risk-
Based Regulation 
 
  Frustration over this formalism and rigidity led countries to replace rule-based AML-
regulation  in  the  early  2000s  (and  in  the  US  already  in  1996)  by  what  is  called  risk-based 
regulation,  leaving  more  discretion  to  the  subjects  of  regulation  with  reporting  duties.  This 
change  happened  at  a  time  when  everywhere  governments  introduced  supposedly  less 
bureaucratic, more subject-friendly, more responsive regulations (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 
Hutter 2005, 2006).  In the new AML-regulation, business got some freedom to judge whether a 
case was ‘risky’, whether it could be a money laundering case, and whether it should be reported. 
This change marked a turn-around from the long-term historical trend from vague to more precise 
regulations, namely a move back again from precise to vaguer norms.    4 
  It has become popular as it promises to have many attractions over rule-based regulation. 
It offers the prospect of less obedience merely for the sake of obedience, less formalism, less 
administrative  burdens  both  for  the  subjects  of  regulation  and  its  enforcers,  in  short,  less 
(‘unnecessary’) bureaucracy. That is, it would also be cheaper. It aims to do so by simplifying 
and focusing, on critical points, on those parts in a system or process - such as the enforcement of 
regulations - where things could go wrong, where the risks are greatest. This requires first an 
identification  of  possible  risks  and  subsequently  an  estimation  and  assessment  of  both  the 
probability and the seriousness or impact of these risks. As is done also in Risk-Based Auditing 
or in HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) methodology. Assessing risks seems 
best done by those best placed to do so, the experts. These can include the ones concerned, the 
‘locals’ of regulation: in the first place the regulators, supervisors, inspectors, enforcers, but often 
also the subjects of the regulation.  
  Hence  risk-based  regulation  requires  that  one  leaves  some  room  for  maneuver,  for 
appraisal,  for  sound  judgment  to  those  closely  involved.  And  those  subsequently  use  the 
experiences and knowledge they have gained in the process of regulatory enforcement to improve 
and focus the regulations further. This is another attraction of the risk-based approach. It befits 
democracy,  where  citizens  are  both  the  authors  of regulations  and  their  subjects.  Risk-based 
regulation offers to respect these subjects, to make use of their experience and knowledge, to take 
their judgments seriously, as useful contributions to rule development and application. Citizens 
and companies, subjects of the law, are treated as resourceful actors, rather than ignorant children 
who have to be taught a lesson. As a consequence, it is hoped that rule observation could be 
realized by intrinsic rule internalization, rather than by extrinsic threats with carrots and/or sticks. 
Thus it promises to enhance not only the effectiveness and efficiency of regulations, but also their 
legitimacy.  Who  would  not  like  freedom,  less  bureaucracy,  more  legitimacy  and  still  social 
order? 
  Risk estimation can be done both by the subjects and the enforcers. They are different in 
kind however and differ from the rule based approach where the regulator assesses the risk. Let 
us  clarify  this  with  the  example  of  a  simple  traffic  rule:  pedestrians  have  to  stop  for  a  red 
pedestrian traffic light. Rule-based regulation would mean: any cross-over while the light is red is 
a  transgression  of  the  rule  and  ought  to  be  punished.  The  assumption  is  that  the  regulatory 
authority knows what is good for its citizens, when it is safe to cross. And he does, because he 
steers also other traffic lights that tell others at the crossing to stop when yet others can go. The 
command ‘do not cross, otherwise you risk your life’ is also told others, though at different times. 
If everyone concerned  around a crossing obeys the commands of the lights, traffic can flow 
safely. 
  Risk-based regulation could first of all mean that we give the pedestrian the discretion to 
decide  whether crossing  is  risky  or safe  enough  to  do.  Such discretion  can  be  based  on  the 
assumption that he or she is capable enough to estimate the risk of crossing-over; and on the 
assumption that he or she has an interest not to get hit. Punishment for crossing-over would then 
only  be  justifiable  in  case  the  pedestrian  is  an  obvious  reckless  jaywalker,  e.g.  because 
intoxication has reduced his capacity for sound judgment. A red pedestrian traffic light under 
risk-based regulation would no longer be a prohibition to cross, but a warning to be careful, just 
as the zebra crossing stripes are. Which is what is usually the case in actual practice. 
  Risk estimation can also be done by the enforcers. For them, it is impossible to enforce 
the rule perfectly, that is, to punish any disregard of a red pedestrian traffic light - short of 
installing  cameras  at  every  light  (and  fitting  citizens  with  a  ‘license  plate’  on  their  back,  or 
another more modern electronic identifier). The police cannot be present at every traffic light. It   5 
has limited resources, and on top of that: enforcing pedestrian traffic lights has low priority. The 
enforcer has to make choices: whether, where, and when to control. If they do check, they have 
several  options.  First,  spot  checks,  based  on  random  selections  of  lights  and  times.  Second, 
incidental or accidental enforcement, whenever police(wo)men see someone transgressing the 
rule while they are on the beat or just happen to pass by. Third, they can base enforcement on risk 
estimations and concentrate controls on known risky places and times: near blind curves; close to 
a senior citizens home whose inhabitants cross slowly; when children leave school; when the 
pubs close.  
  After all, the concept of risk-based regulation is derived from older ‘risk-based auditing’. 
Auditors can not control all processes and all data when auditing a large corporation. Hence so-
called  system-  or  process-based  auditing  has  gradually  been  replaced  by  risk-based  auditing. 
Auditors focus on known risky or critical phases or elements rather than that they try to follow all 
the complete administrative processes. They focus on the points where experience has shown that 
‘things  could  go  wrong’,  where  chances  are  for  mistakes,  malpractices,  or  outright  fraud  to 
happen. The importance of such points is based on an estimation of both a) the probability that 
something fishy could occur, and b) the impact or the seriousness of its consequences. The aim of 
internal auditing controls is to manage risks to acceptable levels in the organization (Griffiths 
2007).  
  Critical point concentration of inspections and enforcement requires that enforcers assess 
in turn the risk assessment of citizens, i.e. such risk-based regulation is based on double risk 
assessment. Enforcers have to estimate whether and when infants, teenagers, or elderly can or 
care to oversee and evaluate the risks they run in crossing. Sound enforcement may also imply 
adjusting  the  disciplinary  reaction  to  the  conditions  of  transgression  and  categories  of 
transgressors. It may not make much sense to fine infants. Better is to give traffic lessons in 
school or to appoint volunteer ‘lolly-pop (wo)men’ (crossing guards), and equip them with a 
uniform and a fried-egg-shield, which should give them some authority, both over the children 
and the car drivers. That is, educate children to make sound judgments and protect them as long 
as it is necessary. 
  Such double risk assessment is what is done with risk-based AML-regulation. First, banks 
assess the risk or possibility that a transaction could be suspicious. Subsequently the risk that 
their estimation may be right or wrong is in turn assessed by state inspectors. In this way the 
knowledge, expertise and sound judgment of the lower-level employees at street- and shop floor 
level can be used. They may know the ‘real world’ of transactions, the tricks money launderers 
use. And in their daily work they are likely to have developed an intuitive feeling allowing them 
to identify possible money laundering cases. After all, commercial businesses are used to risk 
assessment  and  risk  management,  and  have  developed  methods  to  guide  them  more 
systematically in that. By leaving them the freedom to develop their own explicit or implicit 
criteria for money laundering cases, the rules might be more effective. They might more easily 
separate  the  sheep  from  the  goats.  Such  more  focused  information  would  be  more  useful. 
Furthermore, such a less rigidly bureaucratic procedure would produce less false alarms, it was 
expected. Thus the private sector could save on reporting costs, and the administration on having 
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2.3. The Risks of Risk-Based Regulation 
 
Risk-based regulation is not without risks, for the regulator, as well as for the regulatees. Leaving 
the subjects some discretion to decide what to report entails the risk for the government that 
detection, assessment, and reporting is done sloppily and/or that it is done arbitrarily. There may 
be under-reporting or over-reporting, the government may get not enough, not the right or too 
much information. As different businesses with a reporting duty may take this task more or less 
seriously reporting might be erratic, and lack homogeneity and standardization.  
  The reporting businesses also run risks. They risk identifying a legal transaction as a 
potential illegal one, and could get sued under private law by the accused. In order to reduce this 
risk, US federal law has tried to shield banks from such lawsuits from clients for reporting them. 
But banks of course they still run the risk of loosing customers. On the other side banks run the 
risk to get fined for under-reporting. The uncertainty over whether or not one should report a 
certain  case  means  also  legal  uncertainty;  and  as  different  banks  are  likely  to  take  different 
reporting decisions or follow different strategies, this ambiguity could get further enhanced. 
The risk to be held liable may induce businesses with a reporting duty to play it safe, by 
reporting as many cases as possible. Takats (2007) has called this the ‘crying wolf’ problem. His 
model explores the principal-agent problem between government law enforcement agencies and 
banks. The government uses auditors and banks to obtain information about their clients. None of 
them like to give this information, which creates the agency problem. But most auditing models 
focus on the disclosure of verifiable information, while in this case of money laundering the 
information is unverifiable.  
  In this setup harmful excessive reporting might be the result. ‘Intuitively, if the bank 
identifies all transactions as suspicious, then it fails to identify any one of them - exactly as if it 
would not have identified a single one. Thus, ‘crying wolf’ can fully eliminate the information 
value of reports. ‘crying wolf’ can arise because excessively high fines for false negatives force 
the uncertain bank to err on the safe side and report also transactions, which are less suspicious. 
In  the  extreme  case  the  bank  is  forced  to  report  all  transactions,  thereby  fully  diluting  the 
information value of reports’ (Takats 2007: 5). 
  Over-reporting has the added advantage that the bank can protect its customers by diluting 
their information in the mass and drowning the government in information. It might even be done 
intentionally. Banks have at least an incentive to do so. The government expects banks to reveal 
and accuse its own customers, but they are the ones who bring in money and profits. Reporting 
units, so Takats, might behave strategically and on purpose dilute information by over-reporting, 
by behaving like the little boy in the fairy tale and ‘crying wolf’ so often, that when the wolf 
actually appears (when there is really a money laundering case) no one will take the cry serious. 
  The seriousness of this risk for the bank depends of course on the administrative costs of 
over-reporting, the chance to get caught with intentional dilution, and the sanctions which that 
carries with it, monetary or otherwise, e.g. reputation.  
  How these risks have affected the actual reporting behavior in the two countries that we 
focus on in this paper, the US and the Netherlands will be discussed below in section 4. However, 
first we will compare in section 3 their AML-regulations and reporting duties. We have selected 
these two countries, because though they face a similar regulatory change from a rule based to a 
risk based reporting system, they are almost each other’s opposite on some dimensions of the 
legal system (see section 5) and, as we claim, as a consequence, in their performance. 
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3. Comparing the American and Dutch AML-Reporting Systems 
 
3.1. Differences in Regulation 
 
  According to Walker (1999) and Unger (2007) the US is the largest money launderer in 
the world. Half of the globally laundered funds are probably transferred through American banks, 
according to estimates of some lawmakers (FBI, 2001). Hence it is not surprising that the US has 
been among the first countries to enact regulatory measures to counter the threat, and it has also 
developed one of the strictest anti-money laundering regulations. 
  The Banking Secrecy Act (1970) curbed banking secrecy to fight money laundering. It 
was  followed  by  a  series  of  laws,  each  of  them  further  strengthening  money  laundering 
enforcement:  The  Money  Laundering  Control  Act  (1986),  the  Annunzio-Wylie  Money 
Laundering Act (1992), the Money Laundering Suppression Act (1994), The Money Laundering 
and Financial Crimes Strategy Act (1998) and finally the USA Patriot Act (2001) (Takats 2007, 
fn.1). 
  The first specific AML-act was the one of 1986 (Title 18, US Code Sec. 1956), which had 
already also an extraterritorial reach. If the offence is committed by a US citizen or by a non-US 
citizen who conducts at least part of the offence in the United  States,  and if the transaction 
involves more than $10,000, such a person can be prosecuted. In addition to its heavy criminal 
penalties of up to 20 years in prison and $500,000 in fines, the law permits civil penalty lawsuits 
by  the  government  for  the  value  of  the  funds  or  property  involved  in  the  transaction 
(http://www.altassets.net/casefor/countries/2002/nz2627.php).  After  9/11,  terrorist  financing 
has been included as a predicate crime in the money laundering definition in the Patriot Act. With 
this. preventing money laundering became a matter of national security. 
  Originally, the regulations were rule-based. Money laundering enforcement relied on the 
private sector reporting to public law enforcement agencies. Money transfer offices and banks 
had to provide two kinds of reports: rule-based and discretionary reports. Thus banks file a rule-
based Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for cash transactions exceeding $10,000. Rule-based 
was less risky both for the private sector and the government. As there were explicit criteria for 
reporting, it was a standard disclosure problem. Bank reports were ex-post verifiable.  
  The precision of rule-based regulation had however also disadvantages. Not only banks 
but also money launderers were aware of the criteria for suspected money laundering and could 
circumvent  them.  Thus  they  could  ‘smurf’,  i.e.  break  down  large  cash  deposits  of  over  the 
reporting threshold of $10,000 into smaller ones just below it (Takats 2007, p. 8). 
  The weaknesses of rule-based reports led the US in 1996 to introduce a discretionary 
report, the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). This report is filed for any activity that the bank 
considers ‘suspicious’. If a bank spots several transactions just below $10,000 it could identify 
them as suspicious because they hint at smurfing. The definition of suspicious was left vague on 
purpose, in order to keep both money launderers and banks in uncertainty. This made it difficult 
for  money  launderers  to  circumvent  the rules.  And it  forced  banks to  keep  on  the  alert  and 
continually updating their understanding of how money laundering could be and was done. ‘This 
intentional  vagueness  can  be  understood  as  another  form  of  constructive  ambiguity’  (Takats 
2007: 8). CTRs still co-exist next to SARs. There were more than 37 million CTRs filed between 
2004 and 2006 (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08355.pdf). But according to experts SARs are 
much more important for enforcement (Reuter and Truman 2004, Ch. 5). 
  By changing from a rule- to a risk-based approach the government tried to reduce the 
administrative burdens on business and introduced both a more pragmatic and more effective   8 
policy on business. However, by giving business strong incentives to take this task seriously – i.e. 
by sanctioning neglect with serious fines – the unintended outcome was less effectiveness and 
efficiency. As Takats (2007) argued, this policy forms an incentive for business to over-report 
suspicious  financial  transactions,  drowning  government  agencies  in  data  and  thus  not  really 
identifying potential money laundering transactions.  
  The Netherlands took a different approach. As a member of the European Union, the 
Dutch anti-money laundering policy is first and foremost shaped by the EU, which in turn is 
strongly influenced by the policies of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
(FATF), an intergovernmental body established by the G-7 (meanwhile G-8) in 1989. The FATF 
has developed forty recommendations (plus nine on terrorism financing), which the EU has are 
translated into several directives, which have to be transposed into national law by the member 
states. 
  The  first  EU  directive  ‘for  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the 
purpose of money laundering’ (91/308/EEG) included an identification and a reporting duty of 
suspicious financial transactions for financial institutions. The Netherlands transposed this first 
Directive of 1991 with the Act on the Identification for Financial Services (Wet identificatie bij 
financiële dienstverlening - Wif) and the Act of Reporting Unusual Transactions (Wet melding 
ongebruikelijke transacties - Wet Mot). 
  The  second  EU  Directive  (2001/97/EG)  on  money  laundering  extended  the  reporting 
obligation beyond financial services to other economic sectors. Since 2001 car dealers, sellers of 
ships,  art  and  antiques,  and  of  gold,  silver  and  jewellery  and  since  June  2003  also  lawyers, 
notaries public, tax consultants, accountants and real estate agents are under reporting duty in the 
Netherlands. In 2001 money laundering was also included as an offence in the Dutch Penal Code 
(Nederlands Wetboek van Strafrecht, artikel 420bis, 420quater and 420ter 18
th of October 2004). 
According to this law, all serious offences are predicate crimes for money laundering. In the 
Netherlands  laundering  includes  (as  in  the  US)  self-laundering  (if  a  criminal  launders  his 
proceeds himself)
 3 and can be punished by up to 4 years in prison (note the difference in severity 
with the US) in addition to the punishment for the underlying crime. 
  The third and most recent EU Directive on money laundering (2005/60/EG) replaced the 
first one and broadened the definition of money laundering by including terrorist financing. It 
was transposed into Dutch law with the 2008 Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Terrorism Financing. In order to use information more efficiently, a single reporting institution, 
the Financial Intelligence Unit FIU Nederland, was established and became part of the national 
police KLPD (Korps landelijke politiediensten) in 2006. 
 
 
3.2. Differences in Reporting Duties 
 
What? 
In the US any transaction suspected of a criminal content has to be reported in a Suspicious 
Activity Report. ‘If the financial institution knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect …any 
known or suspected Federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations…’ has to be 
reported (http://www.fincen.gov/forms/files/f9022-47_sar-di.pdf). SAR reporting duties clearly 
refer to suspicious transactions only. However, SAR is not only aimed at money laundering, but 
                                                 
3 For the problems that occur within the EU due to different money laundering definitions, e.g. some countries 
excluding self laundering, see Unger (2007).   9 
has a much broader field of application, as it regards any crime, including financial crimes such 
as insider abuse, computer abuse, and all sorts of  criminal violations against financial institutions 
themselves.  
  In addition all US businesses have to fill out a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) for 
any  cash  transaction  exceeding  10,000  US  dollars,  no  matter  whether  they  consider  them 
suspicious or not. These CTR-obligations are strictly rule-based.   
  The  Dutch  government  requires  the  reporting  of  unusual  rather  than  suspicious 
transactions. Under the rule-based approach ‘unusual’ was just a different label for ‘suspicious’, 
since strict and precise rules determined what had to be reported. The difference might have 
become  more  important  under  the  risk-based  approach,  since  ‘unusual’  is  a  much  broader 
category than ‘suspicious’. Grandma buying a car for 20,000 Euro for her grandson with cash 
saved  under  her  pillow  is  an  ‘unusual’  transaction,  however  not  ‘suspicious’  for  money 
laundering. However, the more the risk-based approach was implemented in the Netherlands, the 
more the reporting duties for ‘unusual transactions’ became alike the US reporting duties for 
‘suspicious transactions’, so that the difference nowadays is rather one of labeling than of  deeper 
meaning. 
  In  2005,  already  in  anticipation  of  the  Third  EU  AML-Directive  and  a  risk-based 
approach,  the  Netherlands  developed  an indicator  list  defining  unusual  transactions.  This  list 
consists of three objective indicators and a subjective one. The first one refers to transactions 
with specifically blacklisted countries (a blacklist which is currently empty though). The second 
objective indicator refers to crimes related to money laundering which have to be reported to the 
police anyway. The third one concerns the type of the transaction and the amount which has to be 
exceeded and differs by economic sector which has a reporting duty. Fourthly, the list has a 
subjective criterion, namely ‘a transaction where there is reason to assume that it is related to 
money  laundering  or  terrorist  financing.’  (Annual  Report  of  the  FIU  Nederland  2006:  75). 
Transactions are  unusual  if  one  or  more  of  these  four  criteria  is  satisfied. The  last  indicator 
requires to identify transactions ‘where there is reason to assume a relation to money laundering’, 
which  comes  close  to  what  the  US  labels  suspicious  transactions.  As  the  Dutch  reporting 
behavior analysis shows (see below), the subjective factor plays an increasing role in reporting 
(FIU Nederland 2008) especially for the transactions reported by financial institutions. What the 
Dutch kept calling unusual transactions became in actual fact suspicious transactions reporting. 




In  the  Netherlands  all  transactions  which  are  believed  to  be  unusual  and  related  to  money 
laundering  have  to  be  reported  to  the  FIU,  regardless  of  the  amount  involved.  Transactions 
exceeding  a  certain threshold,  (in combination  with  changing  the  currency  or  other  criteria), 
always  have  to  be  reported.  In  the  US  with  regard  to  money  laundering  only  suspicious 
transactions  exceeding  5000  US  dollars  have  to  be  reported  in  the  SAR,  and  transactions 
exceeding 10,000 US dollars must be filed in both reports. The main difference between the two 
countries is that transactions below a threshold of 5000 US dollars are not covered under the 
American  reporting  duties,  while  they  are  under  the  Dutch.  The  threshold  for  mandatory 
reporting is in the Netherlands much higher than in the US (15,000 Euro for financial institutions, 
25,000 Euro for dealers in big values) compared to 10,000 US dollars in the United States (FIU 
Nederland 2008).  
   10 
Who? 
The Dutch duty to report unusual transactions applies to more reporting units than in the US to 
the SAR. The US SAR has to be filled out by financial institutions, casinos, money services 
businesses, and by securities and futures industries, whereas the Dutch reporting obligation also 
applies to car and diamond dealers, real estate agents, notary publics, and accountants. However, 
the Dutch reporting system restricts itself to one reporting list only, whereas US firms may have 
to file both a SAR and a CTR for the same case.  
  Recipient of the SARs in the US is the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 
which  might  forward  them  to  law  enforcement  agencies  for  further  investigation.  In  the 
Netherlands, unusual transactions are reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Nederland. 
This organization analyzes and classifies the filed reports as to whether they are suspicious or 
not.  Thus  in  the  Netherlands  a  government  agency  does  the  screening  whether  an  unusual 
transaction is also a suspicious one, while in the US private business is supposed to have done 
that already. Thus the Dutch government is in principle less dependent on the private reporting 
agents and could by doing the filtering itself, improve the quality of the information.  
Figure 1 gives and overview over the change from the rule-based to the risk-based approach in 
both countries. In both countries the regulator intended to switch to the risk-based approach in 
order to reduce over-reporting, to improve the quality of information and to establish a more 
effective and efficient reporting system. 
 
Figure 1. Different AML-regulatory approaches and their use in the US and the Netherlands 
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4. Comparing the American and Dutch AML-Reporting Performance  
 
Differences in the Number of Transactions Reported  
 
Considering these differences in regulation and reporting duties one would expect the Dutch 
private sector to report more cases under the rule-based approach, as the threshold for that is 
lower. Such is indeed the case. Before the introduction of the risk-based approach the Dutch 
reported about 3.5 times more per million inhabitants than the Americans (see Figure 2).  Under 
the  new  risk-based  approach  this  picture changes  dramatically  when  correcting  for  structural 
changes
4.  Figure  2  compares  American  and  Dutch  reporting  scores  per  million  inhabitants, 
corrected  for  money  transfers.  In  the  Netherlands  the  latter  account  for  88%  of  unusual 
transactions reported in 2007 and for 90% of suspicious transactions classified by the FIU, but 
only for 9% of their value (FIU Nederland 2008, see also Table 1). This means that the money 
transfer agents report a lot of very small transactions and all transactions above 2000 Euro. Most 
of them would have fallen below the American threshold of US $5000 for reporting duty.  
  Without  such  money  transfers,  unusual  transaction  reports  per  unit  population  in  the 
Netherlands fell drastically from 50,631 in 2005 to 25,093 in 2007. They were in 2007 only about  
half from what they were two years before that (Figure 2). By contrast, the US saw a sharp 
increase in reporting. The February 2009 report report from the US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) noted that between 2000 and 2007 suspicious activity report (SAR) filings by 
depository institutions nearly quadrupled, from 163,000 to 649,000. In 2008 there were 733,000 
SAR reports filed by financial institutions. In Figure 2 they are included as related to unit of 
population. Thus in the Netherlands unusual transaction reporting per million inhabitants fell 
sharply from 3102 in 2005 to 1532 in 2007- even below the US rate of suspicious reporting (2152 
















                                                 
4 The Dutch reported in 2007 214,040 unusual transactions (FIU Nederland 2008). The development over time in the 
Netherlands is obscured by structural changes - changes in the reporting criteria and enlargement of the number of 
reporting units - and especially by  some incidental events. An important incidental event was that two major money 
transfer businesses, Western Union and MoneyGram, were licensed as money transaction offices in the Netherlands 
by the Dutch Central Bank and as such fell under the reporting duty. Such incidental events can have a substantial 
impact in a small country. It explains the strong increase from 172,873 to 214,040 reported unusual transactions in 
2007 (FIU Nederland 2008: 62).   12 
Figure 2. Suspicious (US) and Unusual (NL) Transactions Reported per mln Inhabitants 
 
Sources: FinCen diverse years, www.fincen.gov and www.gao.gov 
Annual Report FIU Netherlands 2008 and own calculations 
For the Netherlands: reports excluding money transfers 
 
 
The sharp fall in reporting in the Netherlands, excluding money transfers, coincides with the 
introduction of the new indicator list for unusual transaction reporting in 2005. This list did not 
only raise one of the objective criteria for unusual transactions from minimal 10,000 to 15,000 
Euros for banks, but it also introduced, in anticipation of the new European risk-based approach, 
the  aforementioned  fourth  subjective  criterion  for  ‘unusual’  transactions.  As  a  consequence 
reporting by banks went down and administrative costs of banks fell by about 20 percent (= by 8 
million  Euros).  94%  of  bank  reporting  was  based  on  the  subjective  criterion.  
(http://www.minfin.nl/nl/onderwerpen,financiele_markten/integriteit/wet_melding_ongebruikelij
ke_transacties).  Banks did a good job, as their auditor, the Dutch FIU, considered 50% of their 
reports also suspicious (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Number of Unusual Transaction Reported and of the Subcategory identified as 
Suspicious by the Financial Intelligence Unit in the Netherlands, by Reporting Sector in 2007 
Reporting Sector  Unusual 
Transactions 












         
Money Transfer Businesses  188,947  88,2  40,893  22 
Casinos  1,129  0,5  250  22 
Credit Card Companies  1,415  0,7  58  4 
Money Exchange Offices  617  0,3  304  49 
Banks  5,900  2,6  2,848  48 
Traders of Goods with High Value 





Government (Customs, Tax and 
Supervising Authorities)  1,347 
 
0,6  77 
 
6 
Life Insurance  27  0  18  67 
Investment Funds, other Financial 
Services  14 
 
0  0 
 
0 
Liberal Professions of which:  538  0,3  251  47 
- Accountants  86  0  64  74 
- Lawyers  11  0  6  55 
- Notaries-public   407  0,2  157  39 
Real Estate Agents  4  0  3  75 
Tax Consultants  9  0  4  44 
Business Advisors  16  0  13  81 
Independent Legal Advisors  3  0  0  0 
Trust Companies  3  0  3  100 
Total Transactions  excluding 
Money Transfers   25,093  11,8  4,763 
 
19 
Total Transactions including 
Money Transfers  214,040 
 
100  45,656 
 
21 
Source: FIU Nederland 2008 
 
 
Table 1 shows also the number of unusual transactions reported by various private sector agents, 
the percentage from the total reports that each  of these  groups provided, and the number of 
reported cases that the Dutch Financial Intelligence Unit screened as suspicious transactions that 
could be forwarded to the public prosecutor. The last column 5 divides the amount of suspicious 
transactions  as  identified  by  the  FIU  by  the  amount  of  unusual  transactions  reported  by  the 
private sector, as an indicator for ‘successful’ reporting by the private sector.  
  Increased risk for the private sector, due to their new task to make risk-assessments, led 
them to report less rather than more unusual - read suspicious - transactions. They apparently did 
not  feel  the  need  to  play  it  safe  and  report  any  possible  AML-risk  to  the  government  thus 
drowning it in data.    14 
  This outcome is in sharp contrast with the model prediction of Takats (2007) and of Dalla 
Pellegrina (2009) and with experiences of other European countries mentioned by them. They 
expected and found an increase of reporting, and they reasoned that increased risk for the private 
sector induced it to play it safe by reporting more. 
 
 
4.2. The Quality of Information  
   
  Takats (2007) and Dalla Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2009) also note that in addition the 
number of reports considered useful to start investigations, and eventually to promote money 
laundering prosecutions, has fallen or remained low in most countries. That speaks even more of 
an overflow of useless AML information. This problems was identified already earlier by Pieth 
and Aiolfi (2003) for the US and by KPMG (2003) and Gold and Levi (1994) for the UK.  
  Not so in the Netherlands. The number of unusual transactions per head in that country 
was already below the number of suspicious ones per head in the US, as Figure 2 shows. But the 
percentage  of  suspicious  ones  that  the  Dutch  Financial  Intelligence  Unit  filtered  our,  was 
relatively  high.  Overall,  21%  of  the  cases  reported  by  the  private  sector  were  identified  as 
suspicious (Table 1). That is an indication of the relatively high quality of the data provided by 
the  private  sector.  They  did  not  report  much,  but  what  they  reported  was  relatively  useful. 
Especially the banks did a good job. While they accounted only for 3% of the total unusual 
transactions reported, every second report of an unusual transaction was classified as suspicious 
by the FIU, and those accounted for 54% of the suspicious transactions value. Other sectors that 
provided  good  quality  data  were  -  percentage  wise  -  money  exchange  offices  (49%),  life 
insurances (67%) and the liberal professions (47%).  
  Relatively successful filtering was on the one hand the result of less but better quality 
information from the private sector. But on the other hand it was also because the Dutch public 
authority FIU had access to additional information, which helped it in identifying suspicious 
transactions. It could link the data on unusual transaction reports with data from police files, tax 
authorities, the Chamber of Commerce, social security authorities, its detailed access to all bank 
accounts, etc. A person who has an unusual transaction of e.g. buying jewels but has a very low 
income is classified as suspicious by the FIU. So is a company who appears repeatedly in unusual 
transactions and is located in areas prone to money laundering such as the Virgin or the Cayman 
islands or who has a police record. Thus the diluted information of the private sector can get 
more purified by the government’s disposal over additional data. The Dutch found a different 
way  than  suggested  by  Dalla  Pellegrina  (2009)  to  reduce  the  asymmetric  information  gap 
between the public principal and the private actors: not a supervisor who checks on the private 
sector’s  information  quality,  but  an  agency  which  has  additional  information  to  fill  the 
information gap between principal and agent.  
  This comes of course at a price, namely less protection of a citizen’s right to privacy. By 
being  legalized  to  combine  different  databases,  which  the  government  has  at  its  disposal,  it 
intrudes  quite  deeply  in  the  privacy  of  citizens.  This  is,  for  a  democratic  country  like  the 
Netherlands,  indicative  of  quite  a  high  public  trust  in  the  government.  Most  other  Western 
democratic populations would object to such a form of data combining and mining, especially 
countries like Germany and Austria which have a recent authoritarian past. The latter e.g. still 
insists very much on bank secrecy.  
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4.3. Convictions 
 
  A good indicator of success is the number of convictions for money laundering. Between 
2002 and 2007, a total of 2,787 cases for money laundering reached the public prosecutor in the 
Netherlands.  Of  these  about  70%  was  prosecuted  further  and  in  1200  cases  someone  was 
convicted:  865 cases ended with a jail sentence (partly conditional), 288 in a work sanction, and 
68 in a money fine of between 140 and 1 million Euros (Algemene Rekenkamer 2008: 79). While 
the number of unusual transactions declined after 2004, the number of convictions rose sharply, 
from 113 in 2004 to 427 in 2007 (FIU Nederland 2008: 26). The number of 1200 comes down to 
15 per year and per million inhabitants. That is more than five times the rate in the US, which 
according to Takats (2007) and the Federal Justice Statistics hovered around 3 convictions per 
million inhabitants in 2005.
5  As figure 3 shows, while the conviction rate went up sharply in the 
Netherlands, that in the US declined. 
 
Figure 3. Dutch and US Convictions for Money Laundering per mln. Inhabitants 
 
Bron: Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center  
www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=11302,00.html and OECD Statistics, FIU Nederland 2008 
 
 
5. Explaining the Differences 
 
How to explain this Dutch exceptionalism of low reporting rates but relatively high quality as 
indicated by high conviction rates? Exceptional, compared to the opposite in the US: very high 
reporting rates but low conviction rates. 
  The  differences  in  sanctions  are  significant.  The  ‘crying  wolf’  problem  in  the  US  is 
caused by private business wanting to play it safe. And they do so, because under-reporting is 
risky  for  them,  given  the  high  sanctions  the  government  has  placed  on  it.  Fines  have  even 
increased since the Patriot Act. Failing to file SARs led to fines of $25 million for Riggs Bank, 
                                                 
5 These US data relate to federal court convictions. According to Reuter and Truman (2004, p.108), there is some 
evidence from inmates in jail surveys that there are little convictions on money laundering by state courts. 
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$24 million for Arab Bank, $50 million for AmSouth Bank and $80 million for ABN-AMRO 
Bank in the years following 09/11.  
  By contrast, non-reporting by Dutch banks and other actors involved in transactions does 
not  get  sanctioned  much  in  the  Netherlands.  The  maximum  fine  is  150,000  Euros  and  the 
probability that someone is fined for not fulfilling his reporting duty is almost nil. Between 2002 
and  2007  371  cases  of  non-reporting
6  were  passed  on  to  the  public  prosecutor  (Algemene 
Rekenkamer 2008, p. 81). This is on average 75 offences per year. In three quarters of the cases 
the prosecutor himself set a fine between 175 Euro and 11,250 Euro. The rest of the cases were 
forwarded to the judge, who imposed sanctions between 150 Euro and 150,000 Euro. 
  In order to reduce the ‘crying wolf’ problem in the US, Takats (2007: 8) has plead for a 
reduction  of  fines  and  an  introduction  of  reporting  fees,  to  give  banks  a  cost  incentive  to 
internalize the externality caused by their over-reporting into their calculations. The Dutch case 
of low fines, low reporting, but relatively high convictions would give him right. 
   However, it is not always so easy to turn the knob of sanctions. There may be constraints 
both in the legal and the political system to raise or lower sanctions. The size of politically and 
legally legitimate sanctions differs between countries. The US legal system typically imposes 
heavy sanctions, both under criminal as well as civil law. Underlying that are some strongly 
ingrained cultural values, such as that individuals and organizations are free and independent but 
as such also responsible for their deeds and deserve to be punished if they misbehave. In addition, 
there is also a strong belief that heavy sanctions can and will correct behavior, that they will 
affect the cost-benefit analysis of free rational calculating individuals in such a way as to deter 
misbehavior, as is also often assumed in the US law and economics approach.  
  By  contrast  typical  for  the  Dutch  legal  culture  was  that  as  far  as  enforcement  is 
concerned, the emphasis has been less on punishment and immediate and harsh sanctions, but 
more on information, advising, and education of potential transgressors. That holds for businesses 
which transgressed standards for product quality, health and safety at work, or environmental 
pollution, but also for individuals who do not abide with traffic rules, identification obligations, 
or  committed  crimes  against  life,  liberty  and  property  of  others.  Many  minor  and  business 
offenses are no transgressions of criminal but of administrative law. And wherever criminal law 
was invoked, sanctions were not heavy and were not immediately, without respect of persons, 
imposed. 
  The belief system behind this was that criminal behavior was considered less the free 
choice of an individual, but the consequences of circumstances beyond his control - poor youth, 
poverty, mental disease, opportunity - and judges were willing to take account of that in their 
judgments. Society, rather than the criminal, was to blame for crime. The criminal was actually 
the victim. Incarceration would only add to his problems, such as psychic problems, loss of social 
contacts, wrong social contacts, drug addiction, stigmatization, resulting in even less chances on 
the labor market. The emphasis was on resocialization, rehabilitation, reintegration, education, 
and  prevention  rather  than  on  revenge.  If  punishment  was  unavoidable,  preference  was  for 
alternative forms of it. Typical for the difference in approach are the incarceration rates. In 2004 
the Netherlands had 101 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, while the US had 721 (CEPEJ 2006).  
  Tort  law  provides  punishment  in  civil  cases.  Though  under  English  law  this  has 
developed as an important deterrence for inflicting harm on others and as such has been valued 
by law and economics scholars (e.g. Shavell 2007, De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci 2007), in the US 
                                                 
6 Offenses against the Law of Reporting Unusual Transactions (Wet Mot), the Law of Identification services (Wid) 
and the Sanctiewet 1977.   17 
it has expanded very much, in the eyes of many too much (Kagan 2001, Van Waarden 2001) . 
The frequency and height of demanded and awarded compensatory and punitive damages in the 
US are infamous. Fear of such liability has induced formalistic legalism in the US economy and 
society,  such  as  detailed  safety  warning  labels  or  extensive  due  diligence  in  economic 
transactions.  Such  tort  litigation  has  been  unimportant  in  the  Netherlands.  Victims  have  not 
started proceedings readily, because the rules on proof of causality have been rather strict and 
courts did not award high damages. Hence it did not pay to litigate, all the more so because there 
were alternative ways to get compensation, e.g., through the social security system and private 
insurance. 
  In addition, many comparative studies of regulatory enforcement in different countries 
have shown that European, and in particular Dutch, rule enforcers - policemen, labor and food 
inspectors, environmental controllers - followed a more consensual enforcement style, compared 
to  American  inspectors,  who  were  known  for  a  more  rigid,  strict  and  adversarial  style, 
immediately  imposing  heavy  sanctions.  (among  others  Bardach  and  Kagan  1982,  Badaracco 
1985, Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985, Vogel 1986, Wilson 1985, Van Waarden 1995, 1999). 
Traditionally,  state-industry  relations  in  the  US  have  also  been  much  more  adversarial  and 
distrustful than in Europe (Lee and Ross 1980). The US had early on independent regulatory 
agencies, which had the task to closely supervise business. Thus in the US, business met the 
government of old mostly as regulator, inspector, controller, rather than supporter and ally. In 
those cases where Dutch (or Swedish or British) policemen or inspectors did impose sanctions 
and such cases made it to an administrative or criminal court, judges often acquitted or reduced 
the  sanctions  in  exchange  for  promises  of  the  accused  to  mend  their  ways.  Typical  for  the 
cooperative relation between state and industry is also that the new norms for reporting unusual 
(read  suspicious)  transactions  of  2005  (mentioned  in  section  5.2.)  were  developed  in  close 
cooperation  between  government agencies  and  the  various  trade  associations  of  the  involved 
economic sectors, such as the banking association.  
  More in general, playing it safe and defensive reporting is likely to be also influenced by 
the broader legal system. And the Dutch and American legal systems differ substantially, not 
only and so  much in the substance of the law, the criterion on which  La  Porta  et al (1998) 
distinguished common law and three varieties of civil law countries, but in form, that is, legal 
institutions and legal procedures, such as court procedures and the importance of judges versus 
lawyers (see also Damaska 1986), the importance of case law versus statutory law, and in the 
ease and inclination to litigate. A standard indicator for such procedural differences is the number 
of  lawyers  per  100,000  inhabitants.  The  Netherlands  had  in  2005  84  lawyers  per  100,000 
inhabitants (up from 16 in 1970), compared to the 373 lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants for the US 
(Van Waarden 2009b)
7.  
  US defensive reporting seems the logical thing  to do in a legal system which  Kagan 
(among others 1997, 2001, 2007) has called ‘adversarial legalism’, and which he considered very 
fearsome as well as ‘woefully inefficient and erratic’. He writes: ‘The United States has a “legal 
style” that remains distinctive. Its lawyers and judges are uniquely aggressive and creative -- or, 
as critics would put it, presumptuous. In no other country do aggrieved citizens so often haul 
highway departments, prison wardens, and business corporations into court. Germans may file 
                                                 
7Barzilai  (2007)  comes  to  somewhat  different  numbers  because  he  seem  to  have  used  a  different  definition of 
lawyers (Van Waarden 2009b used the official numbers of the American Bar Foundation). Barzilai came to only 230 
lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet the US scored also in his ranking in the top, while the Netherlands was the 
lowest scoring Western-Industrialized country. Below it were mostly East European and Asian countries.      18 
many tort suits, but nowhere is the tort law system so extravagantly costly, erratic, and fearsome 
as it is in the United States. A growing number of excellent socio-legal studies carefully compare 
different  national  approaches  to  a  particular  social  problem—such  as  compensating  injured 
people,  regulating  nursing  homes,  or  cleaning  up  toxic  waste  dumps.  These  comparisons 
generally point to several distinctive characteristics of the American government process: 1.more 
complex bodies of legal rules; 2. more formal, adversarial procedures for resolving political and 
scientific disputes; 3. more costly forms of legal contestation; 4. more punitive legal sanctions; 5. 
more  frequent  judicial  intervention  into  political  and  administrative  decisionmaking;  6.  more 
political  controversy  about  legal  rules  and  institutions;  and  7.  more  legal  uncertainty  and 
malleability.’ (Kagan 1997: 166-7) 
  Important is not only the severity of conflict and punishment, but, - notwithstanding the 
importance of principles as the rule of law, legal certainty and legal equality - the uncertainty 
over whether one will be prosecuted, sued, sanctioned, and how heavy the sanction will be. Many 
institutional factors contribute to this uncertainty in outcomes, among them the inquisitorial court 
procedure, where lawyers rather than judges de facto lead the procedures, the highly fragmented 
court system, the presence of jury adjudication, and last but not least enterprising lawyers driven 
by contingency fees. 
  Adversarial-legalism is not only legalistic because of the importance in the US of values 
such as the formal equality for the law and its universalistic application, that is, that its force 
should fall on all citizens equally; but also because the fierceness of the legal conflict, the often 
severe sanctions, and the uncertainty of outcomes induce people to play it safe, to be formalistic 
and choose to ‘go by the book’ (Bardach and Kagan 1982).  
  By contrast, the Netherlands has almost the complete opposite legal system: consensual 
rather  than  adversarial,  informal  rather  than  formal,  flexible  rather  than rigid,  and pragmatic 
rather  than  principled  as  one  of  us  has  argued  elsewhere  (Van  Waarden  2009a,  2009b). 
Blankenburg (1997) called the Dutch style of regulatory enforcement and conflict settlement a 
‘litigation  avoiding  legal  culture’,  Bruinsma  (2005)  spoke  of  ‘informal  pragmatism’  and  van 
Waarden (2009b) of ‘consensual informalism’ to emphasize the contract to adversarial legalism.  
The  formal  legal  institutions  are  also  rather  different  from  the  US.  Continental  European 
countries use an inquisitorial court procedure (see Damaska 1986 for the differences between 
adversarial and inquisitorial), in which the litigant lawyers play only a minor role and where the 
judge steers and influences the process; the centralized Dutch state has also a rather simple and 
coherent court system, unlike the fragmented one in the US federal state, which offers much less 
possibilities for enterprising lawyers to get their way at least somewhere; and the Dutch have no 
jury adjudication.  
  It  is  understandable  that  in  a  fearsome  and  formal  legal  system  as  that  of  the  US 
businesses (and their legal counsel) want to play it safe, stick to the rules, avoid risk and rather 
over- than underreport. The Dutch legal system is much less fearsome for business. Hence the 
latter can afford to save on administrative costs of reporting unusual transactions by keeping it 
modest.  
  To sum up, if one wants to avoid defensive over-reporting of transactions suspected of 
money laundering, it may not be so easy to change some rules and sanctions, as Takats (2007) 
wants. They are very much part and parcel of the legal system in which they have come about 
and function.  
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
How to dodge drowning in data? How to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of AML-
reporting by private actors? How to give them an incentive to report transactions that they would 
consider suspicious, using their expert knowledge and intuition, while deterring business to over-
report? Is the shift from rule-based to risk-based regulation helpful in this respect? 
The risk-based approach was developed because the rule-based approach did not work well, both 
in the US and in Europe including the Netherlands. The rule-based approach led to over-reporting 
as many of the reported transactions had nothing to do with money laundering, but at least there 
were  clear  criteria  about  what  to  report  and  it  was  easy  for  the  government  to  control  this 
reporting and to impose fines on banks that did not report according to these criteria.  
The shift from a rule- to a risk-based approach implies that ‘suspicious behaviour’ is no longer 
defined by the government in the form of fixed rules but by many different actors, mostly experts 
on the street- and shop-floor of the financial services sectors. Private actors like banks, and in 
many countries notaries publics, accountants, real estate agents, and public implementation and 
law enforcement actors like the customs, the police and the public prosecutor, have to and can 
develop  their  own  interpretation  and  definition  of  ‘suspicious  behaviour’  of  a  client  or  a 
transaction. The new risk-based approach has lead to a large range of differing definitions and 
concepts  of  ‘suspicious  transactions’.    In  short,  it  has  increased  uncertainty  for  all  actors 
involved. 
The private sector can on the one hand profit from this. A risk-based approach might 
leave more room for manoeuvre to the private sector to determine suspicious behaviour, but it is 
also much more difficult for the government to control the quality of the information and to 
impose a fine for wrongful reporting. Banks could try to protect their customers by drowning the 
government in data, by creating a ‘‘crying wolf’’ problem, so that the real culprits cannot easily 
be identified. However the marketing possibilities of this are limited. It is a bit difficult for banks 
to openly advertise this to attract customers.  
  The risk-based approach creates not only opportunities for the private sector to use its 
discretion, it also creates uncertainty. And that may be an additional motive for over-reporting: 
just playing it safe and report anything that somehow could smell like money laundering. Over-
reporting could in principle be risky. Identifying a legal transaction as a potential illegal one may 
get banks into trouble with the accused, who might sue them in private court. In order to reduce 
this risk, the US law has stated that banks cannot be sued by their clients for reporting them. 
However, under-reporting is risky in the relation with the government. Banks may get heavily 
fined for that. As Takats (2007) has argued, as a consequence banks are likely to follow a risk-
averse  strategy  and  over-report.  And  we  have  seen  that  in  many  countries  they  do  (Dalla 
Pellegrina and Masciandaro 2009).  
  The different results between the US and the Netherlands that we discussed in this paper 
indicate that whether or not over-reporting will take place under a risk-based regime depends also 
on the legal system: its institutions and the cultural values of which these institutions are an 
expression.  A  legal  system  such  as  US  adversarial  legalism,  with  its  strict  public  rule 
enforcement,  fierce  criminal  and  administrative  sanctions  and  fearsome  tort  law  induced  a 
general attitude of private actors to play it safe. In such a legal system over-reporting is much 
more likely than in a legal system as that of the Dutch, where regulatory enforcement is much 
more flexible and lenient, where sanctions are  much lower, and where the threat of liability 
claims is minimal.    20 
  The eventual effect of new regulations depends also on the pre-existing legal-institutional 
framework  of  a  country  in  which  they  are  introduced,  as  also  La  Porta  et  al  (1998:  1114) 
indicated.  That  implies  that  if  one  wants  to  evaluate  the  actual  deterrent  effectiveness  and 
efficiency of regulation versus tort liability, that is, of sanctions under public versus under civil 
law (De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci 2003 and 2007), or of precise rules versus broader standards 
(Schäfer 2006), it might be wise to take the pre-existing legal context, e.g. the fierceness of tort 
law, into account. Schäfer differentiates between poor and rich countries. Similarly, one could 
differentiate between different (tort) law traditions. 
  Furthermore, such legal systems are not easily changed. They are the product of decades 
if not centuries of development of public policy, regulation and case law. Legal systems are in 
particular path dependent, given the importance of precedent in the interest of legal certainty and 
legal equality. Thus modifying them is not an easy policy option, certainly not if only to increase 
the effectiveness and efficiency of anti-money laundering policy. 
  Takats (2007) has argued for lower fines for wrongful money laundering reporting. It is 
questionable whether such is legally possible or has political legitimacy in polities and legal 
systems, such as that of the US, which express the belief that all vices can be rooted out by severe 
punishment. It might be easier in more flexible systems like that of the Netherlands, but there 
sanctions on wrongful AML-reporting are already very low.  
  Dalla  Pellegrina  and  Masciandaro  (2009)  build  a  theoretical  model  to  reduce  the 
asymmetric  information  problem  by  introducing  a  third  player  into  Takats’  principal  agent 
problem: A supervisor, who can through his skills and expertise identify complicated money 
laundering constructions, herewith evaluate the risk of laundering and the effort made by the 
reporting unit. With this, the supervisor reduces the asymmetric information between the public 
agencies and the private sector reporting units. The role of the supervisor in their model is to 
increase the incentive for correct reporting by increasing the risk for the lying private sector 
reporting unit to be detected.  
  However, it remains questionable whether this solves the problem. The uncertainty over 
what a suspicious transaction is may hold also for the supervisor, and he may also want to play it 
safe,  by allowing  or facilitating  over-reporting.  Furthermore,  there  will still  be a  problem  of 
asymmetric information between the government and this supervisor, involving principal agent 
problems, irrespective of whether he or she is publicly or privately employed. Even publicly 
employed supervisors may eventually come to share interests with the subjects he is to supervise 
or develop so much understanding for the difficulties of the private sector that he may be more on 
their  hand  than  on  that  of  the  public  authorities,  as  the  extensive  ‘capture’  literature  on  US 
‘independent’ regulatory agencies has taught us (Bernstein 1955, Mitnick 1980). The government 
will still have to ‘trust’ its supervisors. If not, the problem will only be displaced, and a new 
supervisor of the supervisor will have to be appointed. In principle the chain of supervisors of 
supervisors is endless. This will only add to the costs of the regulatory system, that is, make it 
increasingly less efficient.  
  Indeed,  many  economic  sectors  have  seen  the  burgeoning  of  what  could  be  called  a 
veritable ‘control industry’ (Van Waarden 2007).  Checks have been piled upon checks. A good 
example is provided by the American accounting scandal, which produced the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SarbOx)  act  in  2002.  Suddenly  it  turned  out  that  the  supposedly  ‘independent’  external 
supervisors, the accountants, could not be trusted any more,. The law created a new regulator, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In line with the rigid and adversarial 
policy  style  that  has  characterized  American  regulators  for  decades  (Van  Waarden  1999),  it 
executes the new stricter rules very precisely and rigidly. The greater external controls have lead   21 
to extra layers of internal control. ‘At KPMG, the auditors are now reviewed not only by their 
boss, who focuses on business growth, but also by risk experts, who rate how well the accountant 
complied with the firm’s rules’ (Byrnes 2003: 68). Also in the companies checked by accountants 
new levels of control have been built in. ‘Companies have spent at least 1 billion dollars adopting 
new  Sarbanes-Oxley  rules.  Corporate  audit  committees  are  gathering  more  often  for  longer 
meetings and asking tougher questions’ (Byrnes 2003: 68). So by now we at least have 7 levels of 
control:  PCAOB  –  Top  management  of  accountancy  companies  –  their  risk  experts  –  the 
accountants – the management of the companies that will be checked – company accountants 
committees – company accountants – the final bookkeepers.  
History  teaches  us  that  time  and  again  the  effectiveness  of  the  controls  is  questioned.  And 
subsequently the costs of the control system increase, decreasing its efficiency.  
  But perhaps the problems posed by the uncertainty of risk-based regulation will disappear 
as risk-based regulation itself is likely to disappear eventually. The subjects of regulation will 
want to reduce that uncertainty. Risk-based regulation will in the beginning lead to an increase in 
misunderstandings and legal insecurity, reduced intelligibility, transparency and predictability. 
Clients  might  feel  mistreated  by  wrongly  being classified  suspect, and  appeal  to  the  Courts. 
Banks  might  feel  unfairly  fined because  of wrong  monitoring of  suspicious  transactions  and 
appeal  to  the  Courts.  In  the  long  run  the  definition  of  suspicious  transactions  and  of  the 
monitoring of these transactions will converge, if not by mutual agreement among the actors 
themselves, then by the Courts. Convergence through case law and the Courts will eventually 
change the risk-based approach back again into a new rule-based approach. However, in this new 
one the rules are not anymore set by the legislators, but by the Courts in their case law. Not 
politicians will be ruling anymore, but lawyers. 
 This will take time though and will first lead to a 
period of legal insecurity, accompanied by trial and error, such as higher number of appeals, 
more police investigations, privacy violations, et cetera. In short, it will produce costs to private 
and public organizations and to society at large, i.e. it is not efficient. But over time precision, 
clarity,  transparency  and  predictability  will  eventually  re-emerge  as  risk-based  regulation 
regresses back to de facto rule-based regulation. 
  The same could be the fate of another supposed innovation in regulation: principle-based 
regulation. The British Financial Services Authority (FSA) has recently pushed this as another 
industry-friendly and efficient form of regulation. It has elaborated this in 11 basic principles, 
such  as  ‘the  financial  firm  must  conduct  business  with  integrity’,  ‘with  due  skill,  care  and 
diligence’,  ‘must  maintain  adequate  financial  resources’,  ‘must  observe  proper  standards  of 
market conduct’, ‘must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly’, and 
‘must arrange adequate protection of clients’ assets’. Firms will want to play it safe and to know 
what the FSA considers to be ‘adequate’, ‘proper’, or ‘due regard’. When are they indemnified 
against  sanctions or  liability  claims?  Legal  systems  have  many  such  broad  and  hence  vague 
principles - legality, opportunity, proportionality, equality, legal certainty, discrimination - but 
these have over time acquired rather precise meanings in the legal discourse. The aim of the FSA-
principles is to reduce red tape and to lower the costs of filling out forms and reporting. However, 
it could very well increase the costs of liability claims and litigation. The operationalization will 
produce a lot of lawyering and new (and old) forms of bureaucracy. 
  This process can be illustrated by the 30 years history of the HACCP quality standards 
developed  by  the  US  FDA  and  USDA  in  food  quality  control.  What  started  as  risk-based 
regulation has developed into a set of detailed SOPs (standard operating procedures) for the 
identification of potential hazards and of critical points in processes where these hazards could 
occur,  for  preventive  measures  with  critical  limits  for  each  control  point,  for  procedures  for   22 
monitoring critical control points, for required corrective actions when monitoring has shown that 
a critical limit has not been met, for procedures to verify that the system is working properly, and 
for  keeping  records  to  document  the  HACCP  system.  These  SOPs,  which  are  officially 
‘recommendations’ but de facto mandatory standards as they are recognized and referred to by 
the judicial authorities, make up now 123 pages. The risk-based system has evolved into a rule-
based one. 
  Whether  or  not  risk-  and  principle-based  regulation  will  regress  again  to  rule-based 
regulation, and how soon, will depend on a number of factors. A major one is the likelihood and 
frequency of litigation over the regulation. Without litigation no case law. Whether or not citizens 
or firms litigate is in turn dependent on the degree of actual enforcement. With less enforcement 
there are less conflicts over the interpretation of the regulation. Though the American federal 
government  tried  to  protect  reporting  banks  from  litigation  by  those  reported,  it  is  not 
unimaginable  that  the  complicated  multi-layered  US  legal  system  will  provide  sufficient 
loopholes for inventive and aggressive lawyers or state public prosecutors to sue. 
  That means that a legal culture characterized by strict enforcement and frequent litigation, 
as that of the US, will sooner produce more specific operationalizations of broad and vague 
norms  such  as  what  ‘suspicious’  transactions  are.  Where  the  problems  of  over-reporting  are 
greater, in the US, the solution will come from the gradual disappearance of risk-based regulation 
and the re-appearance of a new rule-based approach, with the precise rules now being set by 
courts  and  case  law.  Where  the  problems  are  less,  as  in  the  Netherlands,  there  will  be  less 
litigation, and it will take more time before risk-based regulation will revert back to rule-based. 
Thus the legal system itself will provide the solution where it is most needed. Unless public 
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